As a followup to my previous letter dated April 1, 1998, the Department of Energy (Department) would like to provide a brief summary of all activities initiated to address concerns resulting from the December 1997 "White Metal Box" leaking incidents in Kingman, Arizona, and at the Nevada Test Site. These incidents occurred during the transport of low-level radioactive waste from Fernald, Ohio, to the Nevada Test Site for disposal.

In response to the incidents, the Department initiated several actions to ensure that no harm occurs to workers, the public, or the environment due to leaking containers; and set in motion action plans to prevent future similar occurrences. We also suspended the use of the suspect containers (i.e., "white metal boxes") for the waste shipments. Below is a summary of specific activities undertaken as a result of these incidents:

• Fernald Accident Investigation Report. Earlier in 1998, we issued the Fernald Accident Investigation Report (Enclosure 1). The report concluded that the low-level waste leaking incidents did not result in a release of radioactivity, and the incidents did not harm health and safety of the public and the environment. The report provided the root causes for the incidents, and recommended several corrective actions. It also identified lapses in rigor in Fernald operational management systems, implementation of existing procedures, and enforcement practices.

• Fernald Accident Corrective Action Plan. Based on the recommendations of the Investigation Report, a Fernald Accident Corrective Action Plan (Enclosure 2) was prepared. We are implementing the corrective actions and will resume the transport of suspended Fernald low-level waste shipments to the Nevada Test Site upon completion of assessments. We must be sure that all actions based on the Fernald Type B Investigation Report Corrective Action Plan have been completed. These assessments will be completed by the DOE Ohio Field Office and/or the Nevada Test Site Radioactive Waste Acceptance Program Team, respectively; and we will invite representatives of the States of Nevada and Ohio to observe the assessments. The Fernald waste shipments will not be resumed until we are satisfied through the assessments that the corrective actions have been implemented at the Fernald site to provide: (1) enhanced personnel discipline/accountability; and (2) improved waste packaging, handling and transportation practices. We anticipate several months will be needed to implement the necessary corrective actions and complete the assessments at the Fernald site. We will inform you, the Community Advisory Boards, and the representatives of the States of Nevada and Ohio before we resume the suspended Fernald waste shipments.

• Nevada Test Site Low-Level Waste Disposal Independent Scientific and Engineering Panel Report. A six-member panel independently evaluated the disposal site and concluded in its report (Enclosure 3) that there was no significant performance impact that would affect public and worker health and safety or the environment. Their analysis of the disposal of low-level radioactive waste at the Nevada Test Site Area 5 waste disposal facility due to past Fernald waste shipments took into account container integrity, subsidence, and excess water. A State of Nevada representative participated as an observer during the panel's analysis. The lack of impact is a result of two independent factors: (1) the extreme conservatism used in assumptions for the Area 5 waste disposal site performance assessment (i.e., no credit is taken for the waste containers integrity); and (2) the arid climate, low-moisture content of the alluvium (i.e., existing sediment material) and considerable distance to the water table at the Nevada Test Site waste disposal site. Subsidence at the disposal sites would be caused by several factors: void space within the containers; decomposition and compression of the waste; void between the containers and trench walls; and compaction of the material used to construct the closure cap. The presence of stress fractures in waste metal containers does not have significant effect on subsidence compared with these other factors. We have shared both the Fernald Corrective Action Plan and the Nevada Test Site Low Level Waste Disposal Independent Panel Report with the respective Community Advisory Boards and representatives of the States of Nevada and Ohio.

• DOE Field Managers Certification of Low-Level Waste Packaging and Transportation Practices. We requested that each DOE Operations/Field Manager assess and certify that they have taken the necessary management steps, based on findings of the Fernald Type B Accident Investigation Report, - to prevent similar occurrences at their sites. All DOE Operations/Field Managers, except the Manager of the Richland Operations Office, have completed their self-assessment and have certified that their low-level waste packaging and transportation management practices, including operational, technical and business management systems, and quality control practices, are complying with all current requirements. The Richland Operations Office self assessment will be completed by mid-July 1998; Richland disposes of its low level waste on-site.

• DOE Working Group Report to Enhance Safety during Packaging. Handling and Transport of Low-Level Radioactive Waste. This action was initiated to review and recommend improved criteria for the transportation of low-level waste to enhance safety and incorporate best management practices. To establish these criteria, the DOE Working Group Report (Enclosure 4) identified recommendations pursuant to the Department of Transportation Code of Federal Regulations (40 CFR 173) requirements for "... strong, tight waste containers that prevent leakage of the radioactive content under normal conditions of transport of low-level radioactive waste." Our Environmental Management Program has forwarded the Working Group report to the Department's Senior Executive Transportation Forum to review and implement the recommendations, as appropriate, as Departmental guidance. The Forum is scheduled to complete its review by September 1998, for Departmental implementation.

As you know, I strongly share your view that the Department of Energy has the obligation to protect public health and safety, and the environment, throughout our complex. The actions we have taken in response to this incident are designed to help reinforce public trust and confidence in our commitment to fulfilling that obligation.

I hope that this explanation of the corrective actions we have taken addresses your concerns. If you have further questions, please contact me or have a member of your staff contact Mr. John C. Angell, Assistant Secretary for Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs, at (202) 586-5450.

Sincerely,

Federico Pena

Federico Pena

Enclosures

cc who encl:

Mr. Paul Liebendorfer State of Nevada
Division of Environmental Protection
Bureau of Federal Facilities
333 West Nye Lane
Carson City, Nevada 89710

Mr. Stan Marshall, Supervisor
State of Nevada
Department of Human Resources
Radiological Health
400 W. King Street,Room 101
Carson City, Nevada 89710

Mr. Robert Loux,
Executive Director
State of Nevada
Agency for Nuclear Projects
1802 North Carson Street, Suite 252
Carson City, Nevada 89710